

NASAA FRANCHISE ADVISORY

Post-Term Non-Compete Provisions Should Be Reasonable

Updated February 27, 2026

Introduction¹

On March 10, 2023, staff of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) issued a Request for Information (“RFI”) seeking comments from a broad range of stakeholders about how well the franchise business model is working.² The comment period closed on June 8, 2023. The FTC received over 5,200 public comments, of which approximately 2,200 comments were posted to the public record. On July 12, 2024, the FTC staff published an Issue Spotlight summarizing what it identified as the top risks to small business success in franchising based on certain of the RFI responses and academic literature, as well as ongoing FTC work in this area.³ The Issue Spotlight identified post-term non-competes clauses in franchise agreements as one of the top 12 franchisee concerns.⁴

The Issue Spotlight includes as examples some of the franchisees’ concerns expressed about post-term non-competes: (1) they are inherently unfair, (2) they create a restraint on leaving a franchise, (2) they limit competition in the marketplace, and (4) they prevent franchisees from earning a livelihood.⁵ The franchisors argued that post-term non-competes were needed to protect (1) the franchise system, (2) other franchisees that join or remain in the franchise system, and (3) trade secrets.⁶

¹ This advisory is intended to be informational only and represents the position of the NASAA Franchise and Business Opportunities Project Group and does not necessarily represent the views of the North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc., any of its members or of any state franchise administrator. The Project Group understands that the University of Michigan has undertaken a study of the impact of non-competes in franchise agreements and that the International Franchise Association (“IFA”) may do likewise. The results of these studies may provide useful information in the future.

² [*FTC Seeks Public Comment on Franchisors Exerting Control Over Franchisees and Workers*](#) (Mar. 10, 2023).

³ FTC, [*Issue Spotlight: Risks to Small Business Success in Franchising*](#) (July 12, 2024).

⁴ *Id.* at 11.

⁵ *Id.*

⁶ *Id.* at 12. The authors of [*Blurring the Lines: How NASAA’s Franchise Noncompetes Advisory Threatens Doctrinal Clarity*](#) (the “FLJ Article”), advocate a franchisor-friendly tri-partite test focused entirely on franchisor concerns, without any meaningful assessment of adverse effects on a departing franchisee. William Woodbridge Sentell III and Ryan Cangarlu, 44 *Franchise L.J.* (Summer 2025).

In a new Rule, the FTC sought to ban non-compete agreements between employers and their workers (the “Rule”). Because the record in the FTC rulemaking proceeding related primarily to non-competes in the employment context, the Rule did not apply to non-compete agreements between franchisors and franchisees.⁷ The Rule was scheduled to become effective September 4, 2024. However, on August 20, 2024, a federal court vacated the Rule, holding that the FTC lacked the authority to enact the Rule and that the Rule was arbitrary and capricious.⁸

The NASAA Franchise Project Group believes it is timely to provide an advisory on post-term non-competes in the context of the franchise business model. Non-compete laws vary from state to state, and the appropriate scope of any non-compete clause is a fact-specific analysis of whether the covenant is reasonable, in light of the circumstances of each specific situation.⁹

Background

Restrictive covenants, more familiarly known as non-competes, made their appearance in English law as early as the 15th century, long before the advent of franchising. They appeared in contracts for the sale of businesses and prohibited sellers from competing with buyers following the sales transactions.¹⁰

The law of non-competes was well developed by the time franchising emerged as a business model, and non-competes have become commonplace in franchise agreements. Non-competes in franchise agreements typically address competition both during the term of the franchise agreement and following expiration or termination of the relationship. A simple non-compete in a franchise agreement might provide, for example:

- (a) During the term of this Agreement, Franchisee shall not engage in any competitive business; and
- (b) For [x] years following expiration or termination of this Agreement, Franchisee shall not engage in any competitive business within [y] miles of the franchised location or within [z] miles of any other [franchised brand] location.
- (c) As used herein, the term “competitive business” means

⁷ FTC, [Non-Compete Clause Rule](#) (final rule) (May 7, 2024) (to be codified at 16 CFR Part 910) (vacated Aug. 20, 2024).

⁸ See *Ryan LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm'n*, Civil Action 3:24-CV-00986-E, 32 (N.D. Tex. 2024).

⁹ The well-established reasonableness test weighs the legitimate interests of the promise (here, the franchisor), the adverse effects on the promisor (here, the franchisee), and the public interest. See *generally* COVENANTS AGAINST COMPETITION IN FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS, (Michael R. Gray, Natalma M. McKnew & William Woodbridge Sentell III eds., 4th ed., Am. Bar Ass’n 2023) (reviewing the laws applicable to non-competes).

¹⁰ Enforcement of a non-compete in a business sale was refused in 1414 in *Dyer’s Case*. 2 Hen. V., fol. 5, sp. 26. Three centuries later, a restrictive provision was enforced in *Mitchell v. Reynolds*. 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711).

Post-termination non-competes can and do serve useful purposes. However, enforcement of a broadly worded post-term non-compete may impair or eliminate a franchisee's ability to realize the value of its investment and experience, even to the extent of prohibiting a departing franchisee from continuing in any arguably competitive industry or preventing the franchisee from earning a living wage.¹¹ Non-competes should be narrowly drafted and construed to reasonably balance the interests of the parties to the franchise agreement to avoid such consequences. Some states have legislatively limited the permissible scope of non-competes or prohibited them entirely,¹² and federal action could extend such limitations nationally. Significantly, the party seeking to enforce a non-compete, usually the franchisor, always bears the burden of demonstrating that it is reasonable and enforceable.

Discussion

Absent legislative or regulatory approaches, it is timely to consider the appropriate characteristics of a reasonable post-term non-compete in the franchise context. To that end, this Advisory addresses:

- I. The Nature of the Franchise Relationship
- II. Expectations of Franchisor and Franchisee
- III. Challenges at the End of the Relationship
- IV. Reasonable Non-Competes in Franchising

¹¹ See *Issue Spotlight: Risks to Small Business Success in Franchising*, supra note 3, and the comments recited therein.

¹² See, for example, the statutes listed in the attached Appendix.

I. Nature of the Franchise Relationship

Non-competes originated to protect the *buyer* of a business from competition by the *seller* of the business, the rationale being that the return on the buyer's investment should not be diminished by the competition from the seller (who had already realized value from the business). This rationale continues to inform non-competes in the sale of businesses.

However, the buyer-seller rationale supporting a post-term non-compete is strained when applied to franchising. The relationship between franchisor and franchisee is fundamentally different from that between the buyer and seller of a business. Usually, the seller of a business transfers ownership of assets and cedes control of the business to the buyer. Post-sale, the buyer can direct and control the business, change the business, and use business assets as it wishes. In a franchise relationship, however, the buyer (franchisee) does not purchase the business *per se*. Instead, a franchisee acquires the right to establish and operate a business for a stated period of time, consistent with a system established and owned by a franchisor. Instead of selling assets or a business to the franchisee, the franchisor grants or *licenses* the franchisee the temporary right to use the franchisor's assets in that business.¹³ In addition to licensing essential assets to the franchisee, the franchisor usually trains the franchisee in the operation of the business; provides operational support; promotes the brand and the system; and monitors system compliance by franchisees, all of which should increase the value of the system.

Assets licensed by the franchisor to the franchisee typically include, among other things:

- (a) Trademarks and/or service marks
- (b) Trade dress
- (c) Trade secrets
- (d) Confidential information
- (e) Know-how

Franchising allows the franchisor to expand and build value in its franchise system using the franchisee's investment rather than (or in addition to) its own capital. The franchise agreement is the license by which the franchisee acquires the right to operate a business using the franchisor's

¹³ The FLJ Article ignores these inescapable differences. As this Advisory acknowledges, a franchise is not a perfect fit to either the business buyer model nor to an employment model. But that fact does not negate the established legal requirement that restrictive covenants must be reasonable under the circumstances to warrant enforcement.

trademarks, trade secrets, and other intellectual property for a specified period of time according to the franchisor's business model using the licensed assets. The franchisee invests its funds in the franchised business but must nevertheless operate in compliance with the franchisor's brand standards; promote and build goodwill in the business; and make regular payments to the franchisor¹⁴ during the term of the franchise.

II. Expectations of Franchisor and Franchisee

The franchisor and franchisee naturally expect a successful relationship at the onset. Often, however, and despite the language of the franchise agreement, their expectations of the relationship may differ.

The franchisor may expect expansion of its franchise system to increase the value of the brand, market recognition and profitability. In this view, a successful franchisee adheres to the system, shows positive business growth, engages in advertising, pays all fees, makes required changes, and otherwise honors the terms of the franchise agreement.

The franchisee's expectations may be decidedly different. A franchisee may consider itself the owner of the business. The franchisee wants to make a good living, have the ability to make decisions that affect its operations and profitability, and build value in the business which can be sold or passed on to family. As with many businesses, the franchisee may incur debt to support the business. In short, the franchisee may see the franchised business as an entrepreneurial opportunity, something that the franchisor's sales practices may or may not have encouraged.

The franchise agreement is frequently antithetical to the franchisee's expectations, however, because the franchisee is not the "owner" of the operating business in the usual sense. As explained above, ultimately a franchisee cannot exercise total control over the franchised business. The franchisee's ability to operate or change the business, exercise control over its own profitability, or realize the value of its investment through a sale of the business are limited by the franchise agreement.

III. Challenges at the End of the Franchise Relationship

The misalignment in the expectations of the franchisor and franchisee may not materialize until the end of the relationship. At that time, the franchisor can exercise its post-termination rights under the franchise agreement: terminating the franchisee's right to use the franchisor's trademarks and other assets, thereby minimizing or eliminating any potential injury to the goodwill, reputation

¹⁴ These usually include royalties (or a comparable premium on required purchases) and other recurring fees.

and value of the brand and the franchise system; maintaining its customers in the now-vacant territory; and perhaps to place another franchisee in the former market space.¹⁵

By contrast, the franchisee wants to capitalize on its investment and experience in the business and the general knowledge gained during the franchise relationship, perhaps by operating a business that is in the same or similar industry and/or market space as the franchise. Non-competes may limit or even eliminate the franchisee's ability to do so.

Clearly, the goals of the franchisor and the franchisee at the end of the relationship may conflict and can become acrimonious, depending on the reason for expiration or termination (e.g., the result of a default or other conflict between the franchisor and the franchisee).

IV. Reasonable Non-Competes in Franchising

In common law, non-competes are enforceable only to the extent they are "reasonable" and narrowly crafted. The franchisor must have legitimate interests to protect, and the scope, duration and geographic reach of the non-compete must be reasonable (i.e., no more extensive than necessary to protect the franchisor's legitimate interests) and not materially interfere with the former franchisee's ability to earn a living. The crux of any non-compete analysis is thus whether the non-compete is reasonable in all these respects yet sufficiently narrow to minimize harm to the former franchisee.¹⁶

A non-compete is not the only vehicle available to protect franchisors' assets.¹⁷ Trademark laws¹⁸ protect the franchisor's brand and trade dress, and trade secrets laws¹⁹ protect the franchisor's trade secrets.²⁰ In addition, post-termination requirements to de-identify the former

¹⁵ E.g., *Novus, Inc. v. Livengood*, 2012 WL 38580 (D. Minn. 2012); *Rita's Water Ice Franchise Co. LLC v. S.A. Smith Enterprises, LLC*, 2011 WL 101694 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2011).

¹⁶ See generally COVENANTS AGAINST COMPETITION IN FRANCHISE AGREEMENT, *supra* note 9. An initial consideration may be to whom a non-complete should apply. Should funders, investors, or private equity owners who have no role in the operating business be subject to a non-compete?

¹⁷ The FLJ Article identifies the brand, trademarks and service marks, trade secrets and proprietary information as the critical assets on which the need for strong non-competes rests. Yet, egregiously, the Article completely ignores the role of trademark and trade secret laws that are specifically designed to protect such assets. The actions of the theoretical "copycat" cited throughout the FLJ Article would be subject to those laws. Nor does the Article acknowledge other self-help means available to the franchisor, discussed below. The FLJ Article disingenuously proffers the non-compete as the only means of protecting legitimate franchisor assets.

¹⁸ 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 *et seq.*

¹⁹ Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), 18 U.S.C. §1833(b) (2016) and state Trade Secrets Acts.

²⁰ For example, in *Service Centers of Chicago, Inc. v. Minogue and Winston Franchise Corp. V. Williams*, the respective courts construed a non-compete as consistent with state trade secrets laws. 180 Ill. App. 3d 447 (1989); 1992 WL 7843 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 1992). The protection afforded by the non-competes was thus the same as that offered by trade secret laws.

franchise premises by removing signs and other brand indicia; prohibiting the solicitation of customers of the franchise; barring use or disclosure of the franchisor's confidential information; requiring a departing franchisee to assign URLs to the franchisor, remove or cleanse social media, and refrain from using the franchise trademarks or service marks in search engine optimization or other advertising practices; and affording the franchisor the right to acquire the franchisee's lease and/or purchase the franchisee's business offer the franchisor additional means of protecting its interests.²¹

This raises the question of whether it is reasonable to use non-competes to bootstrap or expand such protections. Are non-competes reasonably used only to address gaps or weaknesses in other protections available to the franchisor? Very few cases have directly addressed the issue, but some courts have implicitly recognized the issue and, where appropriate, have limited non-competes consistent with the scope of these other laws.²² Protections offered by other laws should provide useful guidance on what additional protection is "reasonable."

Putting aside the protections otherwise afforded by law to the franchisor's assets, there remain areas which may reasonably require protection through a reasonable non-compete. System goodwill, customer relationships, and protection of other franchisees are among these assets. The International Glossary of Business Valuation Terms defines "goodwill" as the "intangible asset arising as a result of name, reputation, customer loyalty, location, products, and similar factors not separately identified."²³ A franchisor typically views goodwill as brand recognition and reputation of the franchise system built by the franchisor; a franchisee, by contrast, often views goodwill as the result of its own efforts in building a clientele and reputation in its market space.

A reasonable post-term non-compete in franchise agreements requires a balancing of scope, territorial or market reach, and time, and effect on the departing franchisee, weighing the interests of the franchisor, the existing franchisees in the system, and the franchisee exiting the system.

Scope: The restrictive scope of the non-compete is the "competitive business" described in the franchise agreement. The scope of a non-compete may be defined expansively, e.g., any business that is in the same or a similar industry as the franchisor, or any business

²¹ E.g., *Boullanger v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc.*, 442 Mass. 635 (2004) (contract by which former franchisee sold franchised location adequately protected franchisor); *7-Eleven, Inc. v. Grewal*, 60 F. Supp. 3d 272 (D.Mass. 2014) (de-identification requirements adequately protected goodwill); *Novus Franchising, Inc. v. Dean*, 2010 WL 6421674 (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 2010) (trademark laws and de-identification requirements protected goodwill); *Budget Rent A Car Corp. v. Harvey Kidd Auto*, 249 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (non-compete unnecessary based on affirmative actions by franchisor).

²² E.g., *Service Centers of Chicago*, 180 Ill. App. 3d 447 (holding that the non-compete clause was construed to protect only trade secrets as defined in state trade secret law); *Winston Franchise Corp.*, 1992 WL 7843 (same); *Budget Rent A Car of Washington, Inc. v. Raab*, 268 Md. 478, 302 A.2d 11 (1973) (trademark laws adequately protected goodwill; enforcement of non-compete refused). See also, *Novus Franchising, Inc. v. Dean*, supra note 21.

²³ [International Glossary of Business Valuation Terms](#), NAT'L ASS'N OF CERTIFIED VALUATORS AND ANALYSTS (June 8, 2001).

regardless of type that may compete with the franchisor. A narrower proscription may describe a competitive business as that which offers the same goods or services as the franchised business and/or may include an even more detailed description of goods and services, clientele or other factors characterizing the business operated by the departing franchisee. A more specific, narrower scope of prohibited activities leaves room for a former franchisee to apply its experience in a new venture.

The realities of the market should inform the reasonableness inquiry. For instance:

- What is the actual scope of the former franchisee's franchised business and its current endeavor? If a franchisor operates in a specific niche or subset of a market, courts have found prohibitions beyond that scope to be unreasonable and unenforceable.²⁴ A non-compete that is tailored to protect only the market space in which the franchisee actually operated is usually deemed reasonable.
- What is the status of actual competition in the affected area, from the former franchisee, the franchisor's other franchisees and other competitors? If the former franchisee is not competing with the franchisor or the franchisor's other franchisees, enforcement may not be warranted.²⁵
- Has the former franchisee complied with the franchisor's post-termination requirements to de-identify the business premises, vehicles and signage; reassigned telephone numbers; and ceased using any of the franchisor's marks?²⁶ In the virtual marketplace, has the former franchisee assigned URLs, canceled or cleansed social media, and ceased all use of the franchise brand on websites or in search engine optimization or similar practices. Compliance with such post-termination requirements reduces the likelihood of injury to the brand.

²⁴ E.g., *Hacienda Mexican Restaurant of Kalamzoo Corp. v. Hacienda Franchise Group*, 569 N.E.2d 661 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (finding prohibition from operating any Mexican restaurant overly broad); *ICENY USA v. M&M's LLC*, 421 F. Supp. 3d 204 (D. Md. 2019) (narrowing the restriction to franchise products only); *Winston Franchise Corp.*, 1992 WL 7843 (finding the non-compete broadly applicable to food industry unenforceable; former franchisee focused on a narrow subset of the larger industry); *Mister Softee, Inc. v. Taikos*, 2014 WL 2535114 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2014) (same).

²⁵ E.g., *SH Franchising LLC v. Newlands Homecare*, 2019 WL 356658 (D. Md. Jan. 29, 2019) (former franchisee's operations could not compete with franchise system; enforcement denied); *Physicians Weight Loss Centers of America v. Creighton*, 1992 WL 176992 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 1992) (finding that the franchisor failed to demonstrate existence of competition from former franchisee).

²⁶ E.g., *Novus Franchising, Inc.*, 2010 WL 6421674 (enforcement declined; former franchisee had complied fully with de-identification obligations).

- Can the franchisor use self-help measures to prevent or diminish any potential adverse effects of termination?²⁷ In addition to de-identification requirements, the franchisor can consider exercising options to acquire the lease or the business; or the franchisor can engage in targeted advertising to direct customers to other franchisees.
- During the term of the franchise, did the franchisee substantially comply with the franchise agreement? A compliant franchisee is likely to comply with a reasonable post-term non-compete.²⁸
- Will the post-termination non-compete allow the former franchisee to operate or become employed by a business post-termination.²⁹

Duration: The duration of a non-compete restriction should not be longer than is reasonably necessary to protect the franchisor's legitimate business interests. Again, the realities of the market should be considered. For instance:

- Has the franchisor taken reasonable affirmative actions to protect the brand? In addition to enforcing de-identification obligations, affirmative efforts by the franchisor in the form of advertising or exercising contractual options may eliminate potential adverse injuries.³⁰
- How long will it reasonably take the franchisor to replace the franchisee? The more brand demand, the more a shorter period of non-competition may suffice.³¹

²⁷ *E.g., Budget Rent A Car Corp.*, 249 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (franchisor actions prevent/minimize damage to goodwill).

²⁸ This consideration is important in enforcement actions, as equitable principles enter into a Court's decision regarding enforcement of a post-term non-compete. A reasonable non-compete that is likely to be honored by a compliant former franchisee can eliminate the necessity and expense of litigation.

²⁹ *E.g., Juarez v. Jani-King of California, Inc.*, 2012 WL 177564 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012) (enforcement of non-compete declined, during and after franchise term; would have prevented plaintiff from employment in entire industry); *Winston Franchise Corp.*, 1992 WL 7843 (enforcement declined; affect on former franchisee cited).

³⁰ *Id.*; *E.g., Budget Rent A Car Corp.*, 249 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (franchisor actions prevent/minimize damage to goodwill).

³¹ *E.g., In re KBAR, Inc.*, 96 B.R. 158 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1988) (finding one-year to be a reasonable time to replace franchisee).

- What is the status of the industry? An innovative industry may command a different approach than a mature one.³²

Geography: A non-compete usually includes a description of the area in which the non-compete applies. In franchised businesses that are operated from physical locations, the prohibited area may be described by a distance around the franchised location and may include specific areas around any other franchise-branded location. Some franchises may not limit a franchisee's territory or may be internet-based. Despite the absence of an express territory, the geographical reach of a non-compete enters into the reasonableness analysis. Factors informing the assessment include:

- What exclusive territory, if any, was afforded the franchisee during the term of the franchise? It seems logical that a reasonable area in which the former franchisee cannot operate should not exceed that exclusively reserved to the franchisee in the franchise agreement.³³
- In what area did the franchisee operate, and from where did the franchisee's customers originate?³⁴ This may help define the reasonable limits of the former franchisee's influence on system goodwill in bricks-and-mortar as well as internet-based or territorially unlimited franchises.
- Can existing franchisees benefit from the former franchisee's departure, by capturing the former franchisee's customers? If so, an adverse effect on goodwill may be diminished.
- Is there an existing franchisee available to step into the now-vacant territory? A rapid replacement may allow the replacement to co-opt the goodwill associated with the departing franchisee's operations.

All of these factors reflect the general rule that a non-compete should be drafted as narrowly as possible to protect the legitimate interests of the franchisor yet allow the franchisee to benefit from its investment and experience by operating a different business post-termination.

³² *E.g.*, *EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack*, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (reducing the duration of non-compete due to dynamic nature of the industry).

³³ *E.g.*, *Piercing Pagoda, Inc. v. Hoffner*, 351 A.2d 207 (Pa. 1976) (non-compete enforced only within franchisee's territory); *H.H. Franchising Systems, Inc. v. Aronson*, 2015 WL 401343 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 28, 2015) (same).

³⁴ *E.g.*, *Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Associates*, 553 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2009) (non-compete limited to counties in which former franchisee operated).

Conclusion

Post-term non-competes should be narrowly drawn and reasonable in scope, duration and territory. In the current climate of increased judicial and legislative scrutiny of non-competes, the reasonableness inquiry becomes critical. As the preparer of the franchise agreement and the party seeking enforcement of the non-compete, the franchisor bears the burden of demonstrating that the non-compete it seeks to impose is reasonable, throughout the legal process. Thus, when drafting or enforcing a post-term non-compete,³⁵ a franchisor should consider both its position and that of the existing franchisees and the franchisee leaving the system, and, consistent with legal authority and taking into account the protections offered by other laws, prepare a non-compete that reasonably protects the interests of the franchisor and existing franchisees yet allows the former franchisee to realize the value of its investment and experience in the franchised business.

Date: 2-21-25

The NASAA Franchise Project Group

³⁵ Contrary to the FLJ Article's assertion, a franchise agreement is rarely, if ever, the subject of meaningful negotiation between a franchisor and franchisee.

APPENDIX³⁶

Alabama	Ala. Code §§8-1-190 through 197
California	Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §16600 <i>et seq.</i>
Florida	Fla. Stat. §542.33
Georgia	Ga. Code Ann. §§13-8-50 <i>et seq.</i>
Idaho	Idaho Code Ann. §§44-2701 <i>et seq.</i>
Illinois	Ill. Freedom to Work Act, 820 ILCS 90/1 <i>et seq.</i>
Indiana	Ind. Code §23-2-2.7-1 <i>et seq.</i>
Iowa	Iowa Code §537A.10
Louisiana	La. R,S. §23:921
Michigan	Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §445.1527
Minnesota	Minn. R. 2860.3500; Minn. R. 2860.4400 ³⁷
Montana	Mont. Code Ann. §§28-2-703 <i>et seq.</i>
North Dakota	N.D. Cent. Code §9-08-06
Oklahoma	Okla. Stat. tit. 15, §§217-218
Rhode Island	28 R.I. Gen Laws §§28-59-1 through 3
Texas	Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §15.50-52
Washington	Wash. Rev. Code §19.100.180(2)(i)

³⁶ This Appendix includes state statutes that affect franchise agreements in various ways. Some codify common law, some narrow enforceability, and some define specific conditions surrounding the covenant. This Appendix excludes special industry statutes; state unfair or deceptive trade practice statutes and state antitrust laws, all of which may apply to non-compete covenants.

³⁷ These Minnesota regulations are issued pursuant to the Minnesota Franchise Act, Minn. Stat. §§80C.14 and 18.